Wanachan SinghchawlaRobert T. EvansJohn Evans2025-03-102025-03-102010Corporate Ownership and Control1727923210.22495/cocv8i1c3p42-s2.0-84897145569https://repository.dusit.ac.th//handle/123456789/5039This study investigates whether managerial share ownership serves to enhance or detract from firm performance in listed companies in Thailand. The convergence-of-interest hypothesis asserts that firm value increases as management ownership rises. On the other hand, when managers own a substantial fraction of the firm shares, then voting power or other influence may satisfy other non-value- maximizing objectives without endangering other positions. This gives rise to the entrenchment hypothesis, which suggests that excessive insider ownership has a negative impact on corporate performance. The results of this study support both the alignment and entrenchment efforts and therefore the existence of a non-linear relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership. Firm size and industry are also shown to impact significantly on firm performance in Thailand.All Open Access; Green Open Access; Hybrid Gold Open AccessAgencyConvergenceEntrenchmentInsiderOwnershipPerformanceArticleScopus